Battal Doğan
Battal Doğan
University of Bristol, Department of Economics
Verified email at bristol.ac.uk
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Responsive affirmative action in school choice
B Doğan
Journal of Economic Theory 165, 69-105, 2016
452016
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application
B Doğan, B Klaus
Journal of Mathematical Economics 79, 140-156, 2018
182018
Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
B Doğan, K Yıldız
Games and Economic Behavior 95, 47-58, 2016
162016
Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
B Dogan
Journal of Mathematical Economics 73, 103-110, 2017
11*2017
Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints
B Doğan, S Doğan, K Yıldız
Journal of Public Economic Theory 23 (1), 172-196, 2021
82021
Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago
B Doğan, MB Yenmez
Games and Economic Behavior 118, 366-373, 2019
72019
A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
B Doğan, S Doğan, K Yıldız
Journal of Economic Theory 175, 178-200, 2018
72018
Unified enrollment in school choice: How to improve student assignment in Chicago
B Dogan, MB Yenmez
Available at SSRN 2999373, 2017
72017
Explorations on monotonicity in social choice theory
B Doğan
Bilkent University, 2007
72007
When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?
B Dogan, MB Yenmez
Available at SSRN 3223789, 2018
62018
How to control controlled school choice: Comment
B Doğan
American Economic Review 107 (4), 1362-64, 2017
62017
Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
WJ Cho, B Doğan
Economics Letters 146, 8-12, 2016
52016
Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
B Doğan
Games and Economic Behavior 98, 165-171, 2016
52016
On capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules
B Doğan, S Doğan, K Yıldız
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2021
42021
Blocking pairs versus blocking students: Stability comparisons in school choice
B Dogan, L Ehlers
Available at SSRN, 2020
32020
Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism
B Dogan, L Ehlers
Available at SSRN, 2020
32020
Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
B Doğan, S Koray
Social Choice and Welfare 44 (2), 423-432, 2015
32015
Essays on mechanism design and implementation.
B Dogan
22014
Choice with Affirmative Action
B Dogan, K Yildiz
Available at SSRN, 2020
12020
Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism
B Doğan, MB Yenmez
Economic Theory Bulletin, 1-13, 2019
12019
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Articles 1–20