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Song Zuo
Song Zuo
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标题
引用次数
引用次数
年份
Automated mechanism design via neural networks
W Shen, P Tang, S Zuo
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and …, 2019
882019
Learning optimal strategies to commit to
B Peng, W Shen, P Tang, S Zuo
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (01), 2149-2156, 2019
612019
Towards efficient auctions in an auto-bidding world
Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021, 3965-3973, 2021
572021
Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design
V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, P Tang, S Zuo
Econometrica 88 (5), 1939-1963, 2020
522020
Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world
S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34, 17777-17788, 2021
512021
Dynamic Auctions with Bank Accounts
V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, P Tang, S Zuo
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 387--393, 2016
492016
The landscape of auto-bidding auctions: Value versus utility maximization
SR Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, VS Mirrokni, S Zuo
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 132-133, 2021
472021
An economic approach to vehicle dispatching for ride sharing
M Chen, W Shen, P Tang, S Zuo
Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial …, 2019
43*2019
Optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex-post IR via bank accounts
V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, P Tang, S Zuo
arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.08840, 2016
322016
Tighter relations between sensitivity and other complexity measures
A Ambainis, M Bavarian, Y Gao, J Mao, X Sun, S Zuo
Automata, Languages, and Programming: 41st International Colloquium, ICALP …, 2014
312014
Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First Best
S Balseiro, V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, S Zuo
SODA 2019, 2018
27*2018
Incentive-aware learning for large markets
A Epasto, M Mahdian, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference, 1369-1378, 2018
26*2018
Efficiency of the first-price auction in the autobidding world
Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, H Zhang, S Zuo
arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.10650, 2022
232022
Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping
S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2022
172022
Bayesian nash equilibrium in first-price auction with discrete value distributions
Z Wang, W Shen, S Zuo
Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and …, 2020
162020
Optimal machine strategies to commit to in two-person repeated games
S Zuo, P Tang
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 29 (1), 2015
162015
A data-driven metric of incentive compatibility
Y Deng, S Lahaie, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020, 1796-1806, 2020
152020
Dynamic mechanism design in the field
V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, R Ren, S Zuo
Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference, 1359-1368, 2018
132018
Calibrated Click-Through Auctions
D Bergemann, P Duetting, R Paes Leme, S Zuo
Proceedings of the Web Conference 2022, 2022
122022
Optimal dynamic auctions are virtual welfare maximizers
V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, P Tang, S Zuo
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (01), 2125-2132, 2019
122019
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