Emmanuel Dechenaux
Emmanuel Dechenaux
Professor, Department of Economics, Kent State University
Verified email at kent.edu
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
E Dechenaux, D Kovenock, RM Sheremeta
Experimental Economics 18 (4), 609-669, 2015
7072015
Appropriability and commercialization: Evidence from MIT inventions
E Dechenaux, B Goldfarb, S Shane, M Thursby
Management Science 54 (5), 893-906, 2008
972008
Shirking, sharing risk and shelving: The role of university license contracts
E Dechenaux, M Thursby, J Thursby
International Journal of Industrial Organization 27 (1), 80-91, 2009
962009
Inventor moral hazard in university licensing: The role of contracts
E Dechenaux, J Thursby, M Thursby
Research Policy 40 (1), 94-104, 2011
932011
Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions
E Dechenaux, D Kovenock
The RAND Journal of Economics 38 (4), 1044-1069, 2007
482007
Appropriability and the timing of innovation: Evidence from MIT inventions
E Dechenaux, B Goldfarb, S Shane, MC Thursby
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003
462003
Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis
SD Mago, E Dechenaux
Experimental Economics 12 (3), 289-317, 2009
222009
Caps on bidding in all-pay auctions: Comments on the experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss
E Dechenaux, D Kovenock, V Lugovskyy
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 61 (2), 276-283, 2006
222006
Traffic congestion: an experimental study of the Downs-Thomson paradox
E Dechenaux, SD Mago, L Razzolini
Experimental economics 17 (3), 461-487, 2014
192014
Shirking, sharing risk, and shelving: the role of university license contracts
MC Thursby, J Thursby, E Dechenaux
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005
162005
Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames
E Dechenaux, D Kovenock
Purdue University Economics Working Paper 1164, 2003
142003
Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames
E Dechenaux, D Kovenock
Economic Theory 47 (1), 29-74, 2011
122011
Auction-theoretic approach to modeling legal systems: An experimental analysis
E Dechenaux, M Mancini
Available at SSRN 741844, 2008
112008
A Comment on “David and Goliath: An Analysis on Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence”
E Dechenaux, D Kovenock, V Lugovskyy
Purdue University Economics Working Papers, 2003
112003
Announced vs. surprise inspections with tipping-off
E Dechenaux, A Samuel
European Journal of Political Economy 34, 167-183, 2014
102014
Pre‐emptive Corruption, Hold‐up and Repeated Interactions
E Dechenaux, A Samuel
Economica 79 (314), 258-283, 2012
102012
Optimal fines under announced and surprise inspections
E Dechenaux, A Samuel
Journal of Public Economic Theory 18 (5), 786-801, 2016
72016
Ill‐Defined versus Precise Pre‐Play Communication in the Traveler's Dilemma
S Chakravarty, E Dechenaux, J Roy
Southern Economic Journal 77 (2), 351-368, 2010
72010
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
RM Sheremeta, E Dechenaux, D Kovenock
Economic Science Institute Working Paper, 2012
62012
Appropriability and the Timing of Innovation: Evidence from MIT Inventions
MC Thursby, E Dechenaux, B Goldfarb, SA Shane
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003
52003
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later.
Articles 1–20