关注
Yuan Deng
Yuan Deng
在 google.com 的电子邮件经过验证 - 首页
标题
引用次数
引用次数
年份
Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence
V Conitzer, W Sinnott-Armstrong, JS Borg, Y Deng, M Kramer
Thirty-first AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
2022017
Homotopy analysis for tensor PCA
A Anandkumar, Y Deng, R Ge, H Mobahi
Conference on Learning Theory, 79-104, 2017
502017
Towards efficient auctions in an auto-bidding world
Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021, 3965-3973, 2021
482021
Strategizing against no-regret learners
Y Deng, J Schneider, B Sivan
Advances in neural information processing systems 32, 2019
432019
Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world
S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34, 17777-17788, 2021
402021
The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization
S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Available at SSRN 3785579, 2021
392021
Prior-free dynamic auctions with low regret buyers
Y Deng, J Schneider, B Sivan
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32, 2019
262019
Approximately efficient bilateral trade
Y Deng, J Mao, B Sivan, K Wang
Proceedings of the 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2022
232022
Efficiency of the first-price auction in the autobidding world
Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, H Zhang, S Zuo
arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.10650, 2022
212022
Fairness in the autobidding world with machine-learned advice
Y Deng, N Golrezaei, P Jaillet, JCN Liang, V Mirrokni
arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.04748, 2022
152022
A data-driven metric of incentive compatibility
Y Deng, S Lahaie, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020, 1796-1806, 2020
142020
A robust non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism for contextual auctions
Y Deng, S Lahaie, V Mirrokni
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32, 2019
14*2019
Multi-channel autobidding with budget and roi constraints
Y Deng, N Golrezaei, P Jaillet, JCN Liang, V Mirrokni
International Conference on Machine Learning, 7617-7644, 2023
132023
Optimal mechanisms for value maximizers with budget constraints via target clipping
S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Available at SSRN 4081457, 2022
132022
Disarmament games
Y Deng, V Conitzer
Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
102017
Testing dynamic incentive compatibility in display ad auctions
Y Deng, S Lahaie
Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge …, 2019
92019
Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
Y Deng, W Shen, P Tang
Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and …, 2018
92018
Coalition manipulation of Gale-Shapley algorithm
W Shen, P Tang, Y Deng
Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018
9*2018
The complexity of stable matchings under substitutable preferences
Y Deng, D Panigrahi, B Waggoner
Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
92017
Non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism design with budget constraints and beyond
Y Deng, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Available at SSRN 3383231, 2019
82019
系统目前无法执行此操作,请稍后再试。
文章 1–20